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Abstract

Major depressive disorder is a mental disorder characterized by multiple symptoms such as
psychomotor retardation, sleep disturbances, and cognitive deficits in decision making. The
current study explores the relationships between cognitive variables and depressive
symptomology and seeks to determine what predictive relationships exist between these
constructs and if items from these constructs can accurately classify depressed persons. A normal
sample of N = 116 participants were administered the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) as well as the Adult Hope Scale (ADH; Snyder et al.,
1991), the Index of Autonomous Functioning(IAF; Weinstein, Przybylski, & Ryan, 2012), the
Life Orientation Test-Revised(LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), the Zimbardo Time
Perspective Inventory(ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), the Rumination Reflection
Questionnaire(RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and the Automated Working Memory
Assessment-II (AWMA; Alloway, 2012b). A stepwise linear regression analysis determined that
the Pessimism and Optimism subscales of the LOT-R, the Present Fatalism subscale of the ZTPI,
and the Hope Agency subscale of the AHS significantly predicted depression in participants. One
item each from the Optimism and Pessimism subscales, two items from the Present Fatalism
subscale, and one item from the Hope Agency subscale accurately classified between 67-82% of
the depressed (n = 42) and non-depressed (n = 64) persons in the sample. The implications of
these findings for therapy and cognitive approaches to understanding depression as well as the
relationships between the predictor variables themselves are discussed.
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Thinking About How You Feel: The Relationships between Cognitive Variables in the Context
of Depressive Symptoms
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by reoccurring thought processes with
negative and self-defeating content as well as pessimistic orientations towards internal and
external domains such as the self and the environment (Levens, Muhtadie & Gotlib, 2009). An
estimated 15.7 million (about 6.7% of the United States population) adults aged 18 and older
reported a least one major depressive episode in the past year, with the highest percentage of
prevalence in females (8.1%), persons between ages 18 and 25 (8.7%), and Asians (8.9%;
NSDUH, 2008). Persons diagnosed with MDD display marked impairments in cognitive abilities
such as working memory, problem solving, shifting attention sets, and planning (Bearden et al.,
2006; Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005). Severe depression is especially prevalent on
college campuses, wherein 30% of college students have reported a major depressive episode
(ACHA, 2012).
Depression is a complex pathology with multiple contributing factors, yet some of these
factors, such as working memory, autonomy, hope, and time perspective, have been primarily
studied in isolation. The relationships between these factors are such that negative or
maladaptive aspects of them are more likely to lead to depressive symptoms. For example, a
person with little hope is more likely to experience depressive symptoms. Conversely, positive
expressions of these constructs have been demonstrated to lessen the likelihood of depressive
symptoms (Seligman, 1991; Buchanan & Seligman, 1995). In order to truly understand
depression and the cognitive development of psychopathy, we must understand the multiple
underlying relationships between associated cognitive constructs that moderate depression
prevalence. This understanding enables us to develop targeted, non-invasive treatments to the
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disorder. The aim of this cross-sectional study is to examine the relationships of some of the
cognitive constructs that underlie depression. Constructs will be introduced briefly and results
will be discussed.
Beck’s Cognitive Theory of Depression
A widely taken cognitive perspective on depression is by Aaron Beck. Beck’s cognitive theory
of depression (Beck, 1979) has been used in the fields of cognitive psychology and counseling as
the primary model for depression diagnosis (Allen, 2003). The model is triadic, positing that
depression is caused by improper application of cognitive processes in three areas of life; the
self, experiences, and the future (see Figure 1). In this theory, the person may experience a
traumatic or stressful event and begin to think negatively dysfunctional thoughts about his or
herself. These negative thoughts activate and perpetuate a negative self schema that produces
biases toward attenuating to, processing, and recalling negative information in experiences. The
selective attention towards negative information in the environment produces a belief in the
person that the future will be negative, as is the present (Beck, 2008). The present study will take
the Beckian perspective on depression to inform its research questions and data analyses.
In the present study, we will take the focus on the aspect of the Self in Beck’s theory by
assessing cognitive constructs that are negatively associated with depressive symptoms. These
constructs are Hope and Autonomy, which will be discussed below. We are also interested in
expanding the Future component of Beck’s triadic model to include past, present, and future
time perspectives (see Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). For clarity, the literature review will be
organized in congruence with the Self and Future components of Beck’s Triadic Model of
Depression, notably excluding the Experiences component as there was no measure of this aspect
in the present study.
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Figure 1.
Beck Cognitive Triad of Depression.

Negative View of Self
"I am Worthless"

Negative View of
Experiences

"Everyone is against me"

Negative View of Future
"I will never be any good
at anything"

Beck,1979

Self Component
The current paper discusses the component of Self in the context of Hope and Autonomy.
Hope. Hope is the overall perception that goals can be met. Hope is considered to be the
combination of agency and pathway thinking, which are measures of outcome and efficacy
expectancies, respectively. Agency thinking is conceptualized as a sense of successful
determination in meeting goals in the past, present, and future. Pathway thinking is
conceptualized as a sense of being able to generate successful plans to meet goals. These
components are regarded as additive, reciprocal, and positively correlated (Snyder et al., 1991).
Taken together, agency and pathway thinking essentially give the hopeful person a will and a
way, respectively, to accomplish a goal or experience a desired circumstance, but are not
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individually sufficient to elicit hope (Snyder et al., 1991). Hope has been associated with a
myriad of positive psychological processes, ranging from increased persistence in impossible
tasks (optimism) to higher GPAs to greater life satisfaction (Averill, Catlin, & Chon, 1990). The
lack of hope, conversely, has been demonstrated to elicit somatic disturbances, learned
helplessness, and depression (Beck, 1967; Erickson et al., 1975; Gottschalk, 1974; Maier &
Seligman, 1976).
Hope has also been associated with optimism, perception of control, and problem-solving
confidence (Gibb, 1990). Thereby, measuring Hope in the context of Life Orientation,
Autonomy, and Working Memory should provide the literature surrounding these topics a more
complete view of their relationships with each other and depression.
Autonomy. Autonomy is behavior that is volitional and regulated by the self rather than
by external contingencies. Essentially, it is one’s ability to self-govern (see review in Ryan &
Deci, 2004). Self-determination theory posits that autonomy is regulation by the self, allowing a
person to experience his behavior as endorsed by himself and congruent with his interests and
values. Of note, autonomy is often influenced by factors specific to the context (La Guardia &
Ryan, 2007). However, autonomy is also shaped by intra- and interpersonal experiences and
exhibits developmental stability in that there are individual differences in personal inclinations to
be more or less autonomous (Deci & Ryan, 1985b).
Autonomy is made up of three distinct characteristics; Authorship/self-congruence,
Interest-Taking, and Susceptibility to control (Weinstein, Przybylski, & Ryan, 2012).
Authorship/self-congruence is when the individual views him or herself as the author of
behavior, along with fully assenting to his or her behavior (Pfander, 1911; Ricoeur, 1966). Thus,
when a person is autonomous, his or her behavior can be said to be based on abiding values,
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needs, and interests (Deci & Ryan, 1985b; Weinstein, Przybylski, & Ryan, 2012) and there is
empirical support for this idea (Koestner et al., 1992; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Ryan & Deci,
2006). Susceptibility to control is defined as the absence of inner and outer pressures that
motivate behavior. Finally, interest-taking, or spontaneous, open reflection on external and
internal events, is involved in autonomous functioning by providing a motivating stimulus for
action as determined by the person. This motivating stimulus (i.e. an incentive or goal, tangible
or not) allows the person to be open to both the positive and negative experiences necessary to
accomplish the goal towards which behavior is directed (Hodgins & Knee, 2002; Weinstein,
Deci, & Ryan, 2011). Therefore, those persons high in autonomy perceive a higher degree of
personal choice in their actions (Meissner, 1988; Perls, 1973; Ryan & Connell, 1989).
The literature seems to support an indirect yet positive association between parents who
grant their children very little autonomy, the degree of pessimism reported by the mother, and
the child’s depressive symptoms (Hasan & Power, 2002). Autonomy is thought by the author to
be theoretically related to explanatory style in that those persons who perceive themselves as
agents of their own behavior will likely exhibit behaviors indicative of them acting in their own
best self-interest. Therefore, if they are in control of their behaviors, it is also likely that they
would expect to experience the positive outcomes, especially in the face of failure. Additionally,
autonomy is considered to be positively related to the agency substrate of hope (Curry, Snyder,
Cook, Ruby, & Rehm, 1997; Irving, Snyder, & Crowson, 1998) and negatively related to the
Past-negative and Present-fatalistic substrates of Time perspective (Boniwell & Zimbardo,
2004).
In the present study, depression ratings may be related to ratings of autonomy reported by
participants, whereby higher autonomy ratings would predict lower depression scores. This
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hypothesis is derived from Martin Seligman’s reasoning behind the onset of depression
(Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale, 1978). Seligman speculated that
depression may develop when a person has consistent experiences that are uncontrollable and
unstable. Uncontrollable negative experiences condition the person to expect uncontrollable,
negative future events and past research in this area and theory have yielded supportive evidence
of this argument (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Sanjuan & Magallares, 2009).
Specifically, the current study seeks to understand what role perceptions of control have on
depression scores.
Future Component
Life-Orientation. Scheier and Carver (1992) suggest that human behavior is goal-driven
and optimism/pessimism is the outlook an individual adopts when they encounter impediments
to their goal. Research on Life Orientation has yielded that, compared to pessimists, optimists
generally have better physical and mental health and are less likely to experience depressive
symptoms whereas, conversely, a pessimistic life orientation has been strongly positively
associated with increased depression (Cohen & Pressman, 2006; Pressman & Cohen, 2005).
There is evidence that Explanatory Style (ES) underpins Life Orientation (Gillham,
Shatté, Reivich, & Seligman, 2001; Seligman, 1991). While Life Orientation is the general
outcome expectancy that a person has for events, ES is reflective of the individual differences in
how a person habitually explains the causes of good and bad events and has been found to
predict subjective well-being, depression, and academic achievement (Buchanan & Seligman,
1995). People that explain negative events using internal (“I am the cause of this event”), stable
(“I will continually cause these events”), and global (“Events like these will effect my life
greatly”) explanations are considered as having a pessimistic ES. Conversely, those who explain
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negative events using these explanations are described as having an optimistic ES (Seligman,
1991).
Understanding the relationship between Life Orientation and ES is important when
examining depression from a cognitive perspective. As mentioned before, Beck’s theory of
depression supports that negative interpretations for the cause of an event leads to negative
thoughts which then leads to increased depressive symptomology (Beck, 1979). Ultimately,
negative thoughts precede the symptoms of depression and serve to perpetuate these symptoms,
thereby highlighting the importance of an optimistic ES (how a person explains an event) and, in
turn, an optimistic Life Orientation (his or her general expectancy for event outcomes).
Time Perspective. Time perspective is how individuals organize and divide their
experiences between time zones and categories to facilitate decision-making. A person’s time
perspective effects decision-making by locating the primary set of psychological influences
within the temporal frames of present, past, and future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). It is divided
into three perspectives and these perspectives have two substrates to each of them. Past Positive
orientations denote a focus on previous positive events and Past Negative orientations denote a
focus on previous negative events. Present Hedonism orientations have characteristic behaviors
that are less under control of past and future consequences. People of these types of orientation
typically make decisions based off information perceived in the present moment, what feels good
or what doesn’t. Present Fatalism can be conceptualized as the orientation a person takes when
he believes that no action can be taken to influence the current situation or that events are fixed
and determined. This orientation is theoretically similar to learned helplessness research, in that
the experience of learned helplessness is that of the user believing that there is no self-governed
influence on the aspects of the situation causing harm (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995). Finally,

THINKING ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL

10

future orientation describes the profile of time perspective associated with the consistent future
thinking and planning of goals. Boniwell and Zimbardo (2004) posit that a balanced shifting
between time perspectives is important for strong psychological health and ideal performance in
life.
While there has been no known research concerning the direct link between Time
Perspective and the constructs examined in this study, such as working memory, hope, and life
orientation, there does seem to be a connection between all five factors of Time Perspective and
depressive symptoms (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Pluck et al. (2008) demonstrated that low
scores on Past-Positive and high scores on Past-Negative and Present Fatalism subscales were
associated highly with the depression in a homeless person sample, even in the presence of
normal Present-Hedonism and Future orientation scores. The current study seeks to determine
links between these five factors of time perspective and the other constructs reviewed in the
context of depression.
OTHER FACTORS
Rumination. Depression has been demonstrated to be closely associated with engagement in
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Beevers,
Rohde, Stice, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007; McMurrich & Johnson, 2008; Levens, Muhtadie &
Gotlib, 2009). Rumination is a coping method for negative mood that involves self-focused
attention characterized by self-reflective, as well as repetitive and passive focus on the negative
mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; NolenHoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). Rumination is
comprised of reflection, which is a repetitive focus on positive emotions, and brooding, a
repetitive focus on negative emotions. Depressed persons have been observed to brood more
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frequently than non-depressed persons, whereas non-depressed persons have been observed to
reflect more than depressed persons (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). These data
indicate that depressive symptoms may be largely moderated by cognitive processes and perhaps
general cognitive constructs.
One explanation for why this pattern exists is that people who ruminate may engage in
improper cognitive resource allocation towards ruminative thoughts rather than towards goalrelevant tasks (Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009). Indeed, studies have observed that depressed
persons are less effective at tasks that do not have a specific goal or strategy to retain their
attention (Hertel & Rude, 1991) and have difficulty maintaining positive information and
disengaging from negative information in working memory (Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009;
Levens & Gotlib, 2015). Moreover, Joorman, Levens, and Gotlib (2011) have demonstrated that
depressed participants found it more difficult than non-depressed participants to process negative
information and keep that information out of working memory (also see Daches & Mor, 2015).
With the accumulation of this evidence, rumination is an important factor to examine to gain a
holistic view of the cognitive processes involved in depression.
Working Memory. An emerging addition to the literature on depression is working memory.
There is a growing body of research indicating that working memory plays a crucial role in
emotional regulation. Working memory can be conceptualized as a dual-process system,
comprising of recalling relevant information and processing information (Baddeley, 1996;
Cowan, 2006; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Recall refers to the capacity or
amount of information remembered in a specified sequence, while processing is controlled by a
centralized cognitive component (i.e., the central executive or controlled attention). This latter
function has been linked with processing emotions.
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One theoretical model of working memory suggests that processing of verbal and visuospatial information is underpinned by distinct cognitive mechanisms (see Alloway & Alloway,
2013, for further discussion). On this basis, it is possible that verbal working memory is linked to
verbal-based emotional regulation, such as replaying conversations (Joorman & Gotlib, 2008),
while visuo-spatial working memory is associated with visual emotional regulation, such as
replaying a scene (Levens & Gotlib, 2010). Storbeck and Watson (2014) also suggest that the
reciprocity between working memory and emotional states is stimulus-dependent: completing a
verbal working memory task leads a person to feel more positive and attend longer to positive
stimuli, while completing a spatial working memory tasks is associated with higher levels of
negative attention and affect. Neuroimaging research supports the reciprocity between affect and
working memory. When participants were presented with stimuli that elicited negative affect and
a spatial working memory task, fMRI images showed less activation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (which is associated with working memory functioning), compared to
misaligned experimental conditions such as presenting participants with similar negatively
affective stimuli and a verbal working memory task (Gray, 2001).
Working memory has also recently been linked to dispositional optimism, the view that
actions are based on positive and negative expectancies for the future. According to the biased
competition theory, sensory inputs, such as experiences, are the bottom-up factors that compete
for attention and working memory is a top-down factor that allocates attention accordingly
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Thus, when an impediment presents itself, working memory is
recruited to focus attention on a weaker stimulus in order to meet a goal (Woodman & Luck,
2007). To date, there has been one study specifically examining working memory and
dispositional optimism jointly: Levens and Gotlib (2012) found that pessimistic individuals took
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longer to match emotionally positive stimuli (‘happy’ human faces) in a working memory task
compared to optimistic individuals. The authors considered that pessimists exhibit a bias towards
noticing negative information and therefore experienced greater difficulty in processing positive
information.
We extended this research further by investigating the relationship between working
memory, and dispositional optimism, as well as depression (Alloway, Horton, & Moulder, 2016).
Previous findings revealed that visuospatial working memory was a significant mediator to the
predictive relationship between pessimism (but not optimism) and depression. Lower
visuospatial working memory scores were associated with higher levels of pessimism, which is
consistent with the biased competition theory. Pessimists attend more to negative stimuli in the
environment, exhibiting a negativity bias. This bias refers to the idea that individuals allocate
preferential attention to negative visual stimuli, such as faces (Fiske, 1980) and words (Ohira,
Winton, & Oyama; 1998). Perhaps pessimists use their visual skills to process negative
information because of their negativity bias presents negative information as a stronger stimulus
than other neutral or more positive stimuli. Over use of this bias without correction could be a
contributing factor to depressive symptomology or a vulnerability to depression. This evidence
seems to be heuristically similar to the mechanics of rumination and its role in depression. At
present, it is not clear whether verbal working memory may be linked to optimism.
The current study contributes two novel aspects to depression research. The first is that
the current study’s sample is from a non-college and non-clinically depressed population which
will extend the literature the cognitive literature on depression to alternative populations.
Additionally, the current study seeks to examine a synthesis of multiple variables related to
depression to determine which constructs are most predictive of depression and could the items

THINKING ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL

14

used to measure these constructs accurately classify depressed groups of people. Accurate
classification via these constructs would provide further information on cognitive risk factors for
depression. It is also possible that some of these variables may be indirect predictors of
depression in the context of other variables related to depression and as such may be the case,
these patterns will be explored as well.
Method
Participants
Participants were 116 volunteers, aged between 16 and 79 years (38% males), who were
members Amazon’s mTurk survey system. Ethnic percentages were 65.5% White, 24.1%
Asian/Pacific Islander, 6% Black or African American, 1.7% Other, and .9% Hispanic. Income
bands were measured and percentages of groups were 20.7% $30,000 to $39,999, 14.7% $10,000
to $19,999, 12.1% $40,000 to $49,999, 11.2% $20,000 to $29,999, 9.5% $100,000 or more,
8.6% $50,000 to $59,999 and $70,000 to $79,999, 6.9% Less than $9,9999, 5.2% $60,000 to
$69,999, and .9% $80,000 to $89,999 and $90,000 to $99,999.
Materials
Depression. We administered the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977), consisting of 20 items that measure the frequency of self-reported
depressive symptoms. Each statement inquires the frequency that the participant experienced
depressive symptoms during the past week. Each statement was rated on a 4-point scale with a
selection of 0 = Rarely of none of the time (less than 1 day), indicating less depressive symptoms
to 3 = All of the time (5-7 days), indicating more depressive symptoms. Scores were summed to
achieve an overall score, with the minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 60. Total scores
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of 16 or higher were considered indicative of depression. Test-retest reliability was .67 and the
Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .85 to .90.
Hope. We administered the Adult Hope Scale (AHS; Snyder et al., 1991), consisting of
12 items including agency (e.g., I meet the goals that I set for myself) and pathway (e.g., Even
when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way to solve the problem) subscales (four items
each, plus four filler items) wherein each statement was rated on an 8-point scale with
1=definitely false and 8=definitely true The agency and pathway scores were summed together to
achieve an overall score, with a minimum score of 8 and a maximum score of 32. High scores
indicated higher hope in both agency and pathway substrates. Test-retest reliability was .82 and
the Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .74 to .84.
Autonomy. Participants responded to 15 items from the Index of Autonomous
Functioning (IAF; Weinstein, Przybylski, & Ryan, 2012). The items measured autonomous
functioning which consist of the authorship, interest-taking, and susceptibility to control (five
items each). Each item was rated on a 5-point scale with a 1=not at all true and 5=completely
true (e.g., My decisions represent my most important values and feelings). The susceptibility to
control subscale was reverse scored and summed together with authorship and interest-taking
items to produce a total autonomous functioning score. Total IAF scores ranged from 15 to 75
(the midpoint is 45), with high scores indicating more autonomous functioning. Test-retest
reliability was .86 and Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .81 to .83.
Life Orientation. We administered the Life Orientation Test- Revised (LOT-R; Scheier,
Carver, & Bridges, 1994), which consists of optimism and pessimism subscales (three items
each, plus four filler items). Each statement was rated on a 5-point scale with 1= I agree a lot
and 5= I disagree a lot). The pessimism items were reverse scored and summed together with the
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optimism items to yield an overall optimism score. Total LOT-R scores ranged from 6 to 30 (the
scale midpoint is 18), with low scores indicating an optimistic outlook. Average test-retest
reliability was .66 and the Cronbach’s alphas was .78.
Time Perspective. We administered the 56-item Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory
(ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) to participants. The ZTPI measures five factors (past positive,
past negative, present hedonistic, present fatalistic, future orientation) each on a 5-point Likert
scale that ranged from 1=very uncharacteristic to 5=very characteristic (e.g., I do things
impulsively). Five items were reverse scored and each of the five factors were summed
individually and divided by the number of questions for each factor, yielding an average score
for each factor. Higher scores indicated a stronger orientation to that factor (High score in future
orientation indicates a strong future time orientation). Test retest reliability ranged from .70 to
.80 and Cronbach’s alpha was .74.
Rumination. Participants responded to 24 items from the Rumination Reflection
Questionairre (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). This scale measures two factors, rumination
and reflection, on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly
agree. Nine items were reversed scored and both subscales were summed together, with higher
scores indicating greater amounts of rumination and reflection (e.g., My attention is often focused
on aspects of myself I wish I’d stop thinking about). Test retest reliability was .87 and
Cronbach’s alpha was .90 and .89, respectively, for rumination and reflection subscales
(DaSilveira, DeSouza, & Gomes, 2015; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Working memory. Working memory was measured using a beta version of a
standardized memory assessment, the Automated Working Memory Assessment-II (AWMA;
Alloway, 2012b). For verbal working memory tests, we administered the processing letter recall
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test. The participant views a letter in red that stays on the computer screen for one second.
Another letter in black immediately follows this on the screen. Participants verified whether the
black letter was the same as the red letter by clicking on a box marked either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on
the screen. They then clicked on the red letters they saw in the correct sequence.
For the visual spatial working memory test, we administered the Mr. X task. The
participant viewed an animated picture of a boy holding a ball in either hand. The section next to
picture displayed a grid of six dots that represent the positioning of the ball in the boy’s hand and
the participant clicked the correct corresponding dot on the grid section specific to where the boy
was holding the ball in the pictures.
Results
The current study seeks to determine what predictive relationships exist between the constructs
and depression. Therefore, stepwise linear regressions were ran to test these relationships.
Additionally, the current study seeks to determine what scale items could significantly classify
depressed and non-depressed groups. Discriminant function analyses were ran to explore this
idea.
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Min

Max

Mean

SD

Autonomy

37.00

71.00

53.03

6.58

Depression

.00

44.00

13.46

11.45

Hope

17.00

64.00

48.36

8.94

Life-Orientation

1.00

24.00

14.51

4.48

Rumination

53.00

104.00

77.64

11.71
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Verbal WM

12

127

96.95

25.23

Visual Spatial WM

16

136

85.16

20.70

Future Orientation

2.54

4.54

3.59

.46

Past Negative Orientation

1.00

4.70

3.19

.80

Past Positive Orientation

1.89

4.89

3.45

.58

Present Fatalism Orientation

1.00

4.78

2.84

.81

Present Hedonism Orientation

1.87

4.53

3.21

.61

Note: WM = Working Memory
Descriptive statistics for scores in depression, life orientation, rumination, hope, time
perspective, autonomy, and working memory are shown in Table 1. We were also interested in
the relationship between these factors and the correlation coefficients are shown in Table 2.
Table 2.
Correlations among Variables.
1. Verbal
Working
Memory
2. Visual
Spatial
Working
Memory
3.
Agency
4.
Pathway
5.
Authorsh
ip
6.
Suscepti
bility to
Control
7. Interet
Taking
8.
Depressi
on
9.
Optimis
m
10.
Pessimis
m

2

3

.608*

.09
2

.067

.11
2

.098

*

-

-

4

5
.142

6
.275
**

7

8

-.083

.278*

9

10
.267*

.089

*

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

-.012

.104

.211*

.141

.288*

.375*

.076

*

*

.108

.229*

.006

.269*

.361*

*

*

.029

.125

*

.112

.138

.283*

.039

.180

.133

-.090

*

.657

.457

**

**

-

.369
**

-

.015

.213*

.039

.201*

.130

.402*

.582*
*

.056

.236*

.063

-.101

-.053

-.174

.079

-.034

*

.306

*

*

.196*
.363*

.373*
*

.405

*

*

.202*

.211*

.495*

.431*

*

-

.380*

.407*

*

*

-

.043
-

.009

*

.103

-.043

.107

.599*

*

.388*
*

-.151

.460*

.604*

*

*

-

.200*

.172
.497*
*

.253*

.325*

.286*

*

*

-.013

.189*

.188*

-.021

*

.109

-.132

.125

.522*

.622*

*

*

.449

*

*

.491

.379*

.371*

.427*

.308*

**

*

*

*

*

.486*

.344*

.221*

.154
.228

*

.491*

-.043

.140

.437*

*

.461
**

.078

.163

*

.079
.178

*

*

.221

.422*

.321*

*

*

.042

.303*

.369*

.517*

*

*

*

-

.424*
*

*

*

.004
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-

.223

.682*
*

-.064

.210*

-.019

.237*

.005

.345*
*

.145

*

-

-

.005
-

.573

-.010
*

.701

*

*

.159

-.099

-

.013

*

.740*

.124
.320
**

*

.089

-

.087
-

In the following section, it is reported in a series of regression analyses where, based on
the correlation output, all variables that were significantly correlated with the target variable
were used as predictor variables
Predictors of Depression
We conducted a stepwise regression analysis on the total score for Depression (CESD) as
the outcome variable. Based on the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly
correlated with depression were used as predictor variables. Predictor variables entered were
Verbal and Visual Spatial Working Memory, Hope Agency and Pathways, Autonomy
Authorship, Interest-Taking, and Susceptibility to Control, Optimism and Pessimism,
Rumination (subscale), and Past Negative, Past Positive, Present Fatalistic, and Present
Hedonistic time perspectives. Model statistics, as well as standardized beta values and tstatistics, are provided in Table 3. Scores for Optimism, Pessimism, Present Fatalism, and Hope
Agency were significant predictors of depression.
In order to inform the literature on the nature of predictive relationships, multiple
subsequent regression analyses were run with different outcome variables.
Predictors of Present Fatalism
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We conducted a stepwise regression analysis on the Present Fatalism subscale scores as
the outcome variable. Based on the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly
correlated with Present Fatalism were used as predictor variables. Model statistics, as well as
standardized beta values and t-statistics, are provided in Table 3. Scores for the Pessimism,
Present Hedonism, Past Negative, and Rumination subscales were significant predictors of
Present Fatalism.
Predictors of Hope Agency
We conducted a stepwise regression analysis on the Adult Hope Scale-Agency subscale
scores as the outcome variable. Based on the correlation analyses, all variables that were
significantly correlated with Hope Agency were used as predictor variables. Model statistics, as
well as standardized beta values and t-statistics, are provided in Table 3. Scores for Optimism,
Present Hedonism, Hope Pathway were significant predictors of Hope Agency.
Predictors of Pessimism
In order to investigate predictors of life orientation, we conducted a stepwise regression
analysis on the self-reported scores on the Pessimism subscale as the outcome variable. Based on
the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly correlated with Pessimism were
used as predictor variables. Model statistics, as well as standardized beta values and t-statistics,
are provided in Table 3. Scores for the Present Fatalism, Past Positive, Susceptibility to Control,
and Rumination subscales were significant predictors of Pessimism.
Predictors of Optimism
In order to investigate predictors of life orientation, we conducted a stepwise regression
analysis on the self-reported scores on the Optimism subscale as the outcome variable. Based on
the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly correlated with Optimism were used
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as predictor variables. Model statistics, as well as standardized beta values and t-statistics, are
provided in Table 3. Scores for the Interest-Taking, Hope Agency, and Rumination subscales
were significant predictors of Optimism.
Predictors of Autonomy Interest Taking
In order to investigate predictors of Interest Taking, we conducted a stepwise regression
analysis on the self-reported scores on the Interest Taking subscale as the outcome variable.
Based on the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly correlated with Autonomy
Interest Taking were used as predictor variables. Model statistics, as well as standardized beta
values and t-statistics, are provided in Table 3. Scores for the Susceptibility to Control,
Authorship, and Reflection subscales were significant predictors of Autonomy Interest Taking.
Predictors of Autonomy Susceptibility to Control
In order to investigate predictors of Susceptibility to Control, we conducted a stepwise
regression analysis on the self-reported scores on the Susceptibility to Control subscale as the
outcome variable. Based on the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly
correlated with Autonomy Susceptibility to Control were used as predictor variables. Model
statistics, as well as standardized beta values and t-statistics, are provided in Table 3. Scores for
the Pessimism, Present Fatalism, and Past Negative subscales were significant predictors of
Susceptibility to Control.
Predictors of Rumination
In order to investigate predictors of Rumination, we conducted a stepwise regression
analysis on the self-reported scores on the Rumination subscale as the outcome variable. Based
on the correlation analyses, all variables that were significantly correlated with Rumination were
used as predictor variables. Model statistics, as well as standardized beta values and t-statistics,
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are provided in Table 3. Scores for the Present Fatalism, Pessimism, Optimism, and Past
Negative.
Remaining Predictors
The remaining predictive relationships are provided in Table 3.
Table 3.
Stepwise Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Reported Depression Scores.
R2 Change F

β

t

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.355

48.53

-.60

-6.97

Life-Orientation – Optimism

.131

41.23

-.37

-4.71

Present Fatalism

.075

36.77

.32

3.85

Hope Agency

.030

30.79

-.21

-2.49

Autonomy Susceptibility to Control

.311

43.72

.56

6.61

Rumination

.045

26.55

-.24

-2.60

Past Positive

.033

20.16

.18

2.26

Present Fatalism

.025

16.58

-.20

-1.99

Variable
Outcome: Depression

Predictors

Outcome: Life-Orientation – Pessimism

Predictors
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Outcome: Life-Orientation – Optimism

Predictors
Hope Agency

.43

68.61

.65

8.28

Autonomy Interest Taking

.06

42.29

.24

3.10

Present Hedonism

.53

101.46

.73

10.07

Past Negative

.11

79.81

.39

5.29

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.03

59.76

-.19

-2.78

Rumination

.02

49.11

-.22

-2.52

Hope Pathways

.346

43.36

.59

6.59

Life-Orientation – Optimism

.146

39.26

.41

4.83

Present Hedonism

.034

24.15

.22

2.44

Outcome: Present Fatalism

Predictors

Outcome: Hope Agency

Predictors

Outcome: Present Hedonism

THINKING ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL

24

Present Fatalism

.515

90.20

.72

9.50

Hope Agency

.090

64.41

.30

4.39

Autonomy Interest Taking

.019

45.88

.14

2.02

Past Negative

.460

79.22

.68

8.90

Life-Orientation – Optimism

.052

48.20

-.23

-3.12

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.034

30.15

-.22

-2.66

Present Fatalism

.027

35.48

-.23

-2.32

Rumination

.471

76.50

.69

8.74

Present Fatalism

.216

93.38

.49

7.67

Trust

.031

71.38

.19

3.04

.249

32.90

.50

5.74

Outcome: Rumination

Predictors

Outcome: Past Negative

Predictors

Outcome: Autonomy Interest Taking

Predictors
Reflection
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Autonomy Susceptibility to Control

.212

42.01

-.46

-6.21

Autonomy Authorship

.060

35.27

.25

3.49

Present Fatalism

.362

51.73

-.60

-7.19

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.109

40.16

.39

4.31

Past Negative

.046

31.78

-.29

-2.90

Hope Agency

.411

70.44

.64

8.39

Future

.025

38.69

.16

2.12

Autonomy Interest Taking

.264

35.17

.51

5.93

Rumination

.095

27.22

-.31

-3.80

Outcome: Autonomy Susceptibility to Control

Predictors

Outcome: Hope Pathways

Predictors

Outcome: Reflection

Predictors

Outcome: Trust
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Predictors
Hope Agency

.040

6.72

-.20

-2.59

Past Negative

.039

6.88

-.20

-2.61

Hope Agency

.192

22.04

.44

4.70

Future

.142

22.98

.38

4.42

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.048

18.71

.22

2.67

Autonomy Authorship

.173

20.86

.42

4.57

Autonomy Interest Taking

.076

16.38

.29

3.17

Life-Orientation – Pessimism

.061

14.64

.26

2.94

Future

.029

12.40

.19

2.06

Hope Agency

.034

13.30

.19

2.27

Outcome: Autonomy Authorship

Predictors

Outcome: Past Positive

Predictors

Outcome: Future
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Predictors
Autonomy Authorship

.192

23.99

.44

4.90

Discriminant Function Analysis
Based on the normative threshold of the CESD (Radloff, 1977), the sample was split into
depressed (>15; n = 42) and non-depressed groups (<15; n = 64). We conducted three
discriminant function analyses (DFA) to determine which items from these three scales would
correctly classify these two groups.
In the first stepwise DFA, two of the six items from the Life Orientation Test were
sufficient to correctly assign group membership for 82.9% of the sample (86% of the Depressed
group), (1) = 64.59, p < .001. These items were: “I rarely count on good things happening to
me” (pessimism) and “I’m always optimistic about my future” (optimism).
In the second stepwise DFA, two of the nine items from the Present Fatalism subscale
were sufficient to correctly assign group membership for 67.9% of the sample (68% of the
Depressed group), (2) = 22.02, p < .001. These items were: “It takes the joy out of the process
and flow of my activities, if I have to think about goals, outcomes, and products” and “My life
path is controlled by forces I cannot influence.”
In the third stepwise DFA, one of the four items from the Hope Agency subscale were
sufficient to correctly assign group membership for 67% of the sample (61% of the Depressed
group), (1) = 26.66, p < .001. The item was: “I energetically pursue my goals.”
Discussion
There were three main factors that predicted Depression: 1) dispositional Optimism
(Optimism and Pessimism subscales) 2) a sense no control in the current circumstance (Present
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Fatalism subscale) and 3) perceived goal-directed energy (Hope Agency subscale). Items from
these subscales were able to accurately classify 67% to 82% of the depressed group. Each of
these findings will be discussed in turn below.
Present Fatalism
Previous research has demonstrated that a Past Negative orientation was more correlated
with Depression than a Present Fatalistic orientation (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). The present data
reflected these previous results in the correlation analysis but the stepwise regression analysis
revealed that Present Fatalism, not Past Negative, predicted Depression.
Why did Present Fatalism predict Depression over Past Negative? Perhaps sampling
differences could explain this relationship. In many of Zimbardo’s studies, college samples were
used to construct the ZTIPI, with a mean age of participants at 19.3 (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
In the current study, the Amazon MTurk participant pool yielded an older mean age range, as age
was measured in age bands (94% above age 19, 60% above age 25). Additionally, college
campuses have consistently demonstrated to be environments of high stress and high depression
rates, significantly higher than non-college samples (ACHA, 2012). Stressful environments
generally facilitate in higher rates of depression for people who are chronically exposed to the
stressful elements of the environment without proper coping strategies (Duncan, Brooks-Gunn,
& Klebanov, 1994; Gilman Kawachi, Fitzmaurice, & Buka, 2002; Pearlin, Menaghan,
Lieberman, & Mullan, 1981). Moreover, executive functioning is still developing at the age most
students attend college (see Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003) and, thus, students are less equipped
to employ proper coping strategies than older individuals. Perhaps for these reasons, older, noncollege participants have distinct time perspective profiles that they use to make decisions and
that may contribute to the development of depressive symptomology. Further research can
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explore possible impact that can arise from recruiting college samples versus a wider
demographic in studying depression and time perspective.
The link between rumination and Present Fatalism has not been previously explored. One
possibility for why Rumination is linked to Present Fatalism is because it is conceptually similar
to Past Negative time perspective as both constructs involve a person primarily remembering and
trying to process the cause and effect of negative past experiences. Thereby, there is convergent
validity for the claim that constantly processing Past Negative experiences results in a perceived
lack of control in the present. These relationships provide evidence that engaging in Present
Fatalism is cognitively less healthy than ruminating when considering Depression susceptibility
in older individuals.
With these results in mind, it is important to note the characteristics of a fatalist
perspective is that it does not include goals for the future, excitement in the present, or an active
use of positive and negative memories (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Essentially, a person who is
presently fatalistic resembles a person who could be considered to be hopeless or helpless. The
link between Depression and Present Fatalism may be clearer with consideration of the learned
helplessness theory of Depression (Seligman, 1974).
Learned helplessness is a state that an organism experiences when it is in adverse
circumstances with no agency to change the circumstances and in this state, behaviors exhibited
model symptoms of Depression, such as psychomotor retardation, lack of appetite, and cognitive
deficits (see Weissman, Sholomskas, Pottenger, Prusoff, & Locke, 1977). For example, if a rat is
place in a cage and experiences a mild electric shock, the rat will run to a part of the cage where
it does not experience the shock. However, if a rat experiences the shock regardless of its
position in the cage (a lack of control in adverse circumstances), the rat will give up trying to
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escape the shock and subsequent shocks unless prompted to move by another stimulus (see
Seligman, 1974). Learned helplessness has been used to help explain depressive episodes in a
variety of environments in which humans and animals experience stress and a perceived lack of
control to alleviate that stress. Zimbardo regards time perspective as a cognitive construct that is
foundational for other more complex constructs (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) so it is possible that a
present fatalistic time perspective underpins learned helplessness. Indeed, present fatalism was
bidirectionally predicted by Pessimism, reflecting that negative views of the future influence and
are influenced by a lack of control in the moment. Additionally, present fatalism predicted
susceptibility to control scores, providing further evidence that perceptions of control of one’s
actions plays a role in dispositional cognitive processes. Further research can explore these links.
Hope Agency
Hope is described by Snyder et al. (1991) as a positive motivational trait intended to
facilitate goal-driven behaviors. The present results indicated that individual’s perceived goaldirected energy (Hope Agency) negatively predicted their Depression score, suggesting that a
person will be more likely to be depressed if he or she perceives that there is less will to
complete goals. Gibb (1990) has previously demonstrated that Depression and Hope are
negatively correlated, but what is interesting about the findings of the current study is that Hope
Agency specifically, and not Hope Pathways, predicted Depression: the will to complete a goal
was more of a predictor for Depression than believing there are ways to complete a goal.
The relationship between Hope Agency and Depression (as well as between Life
Orientation and Depression) lends some support to the argument by Scheier and Carver (1987)
that outcome expectancies are stronger predictors of behavior than efficacy expectancies,
contrary to arguments by Bandura (1977, 1982, 1986, 1989). An attractive feature of the
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construct of Hope as defined and measured by Scheier and Carver’s Adult Hope Scale is that the
Agency Subscale measures outcome expectancies and the Pathways subscale measures efficacy
expectancies whereas Life-Orientation measures positive and negative outcome expectancy but
not efficacy outcome. This measurement overlap is likely why Hope Agency and Optimism
shared positive predictive relationships in the current study. To be clear, the current study only
provides support for Scheier and Carver’s claim over Bandura in the context of depressive
symptomology. Further research is needed to determine whether outcome expectancies predict
behavior in typical, non-depressed populations.
How might Hope possibly relate to Depressive symptomology? Hope Agency may be
underpinned by what Baumeister and colleagues refer to as self-regulatory energy (Baumeister,
2002; Gailliot et al., 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Self-regulation involves voluntary and
involuntary responses to the environment that help the self maintain biophysical and
psychological homeostasis (Gailliot et al., 2007) and works similar to building muscle in the
body. More specifically, as more cognitive resources are devoted to completing a task, such as
multitasking scenarios or sustained attention tasks, self-regulatory energy will deplete analogous
to muscle fatigue but, over time, will be stronger and the self will be able to handle more
complex tasks for longer periods of time (Baumeister, 2002). Hope Agency may cognitively
reflect the amount of energy individuals believe they have to allocate to solving a particular
problem. Subsequently, if one is low in goal-directed energy, it is reasonably less likely to that
they will accomplish their goals, which may likely be one cause for Depression. Indeed,
psychomotor retardation, a hallmark symptom of Depression, involves not believing that one is
capable of completing the necessary movements for goal accomplishment and previous research
has demonstrated that low self-regulatory energy is positively linked to Depression (Strauman,
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2002). Additionally, previous research has demonstrated that depressed persons perform
comparably with non-depressed persons on goal-directed tasks but significantly worse on tasks
that are not goal-directed, (i.e. free play) (Hertel & Rude, 1991). These data and others (see
Hertel, 2000 and Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009) taken together provide evidence for the idea
that depressed persons are impaired in their ability to properly allocate cognitive resources
towards accomplishing goals. Perhaps dispositional hope serves as a legitimate precursor for
depression although further research is needed to replicate this finding and determine the breadth
of applicability.
Life-Orientation and Depression
Life-Orientation, specifically both Optimism and Pessimism, accounted for the largest
amount of variance in predicting Depression. This is in line with a considerable amount of
literature demonstrating the link between a pessimistic outlook and Depression (Alloy & Ahrens,
1987; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Oettingen & Seligman, 1990). The inverse of
this relationship has also been verified; an optimistic outlook is associated with a low prevalence
of Depression. The current study contributes to this knowledge by demonstrating how life
orientation relates to other cognitive constructs which will be explored further separately for
reader clarity.
Pessimism. Pessimism shared additional reciprocally predictive relationships with the
autonomy subscale Susceptibility to Control and predicted Autonomy Authorship, Past Positive
and Present Fatalistic time perspectives, and Rumination. Some general results are that
individuals are more likely to believe that future outcomes will not be favorable (Pessimism) if
they perceive that their actions are highly susceptible to control and they are more likely to think
fatalistically if they believe future outcomes will be unfavorable. Moreover, a person is more

THINKING ABOUT HOW YOU FEEL

33

likely to think about Past Negative experiences (Rumination, in this case) if he or she believes
that future outcomes will be unfavorable.
The findings suggest that Pessimism affects perceptions of control and the types of
information, positive or negative, remembered by the agent. This relationship could possibly be
due to early experiences with adverse environments. Research by Smith et al. (2013)
demonstrated that pessimists self-report more adverse social experiences than positive ones,
possibly indicating that they experience more goal failures than goal accomplishment (with the
assumption that a negative experience is one in which the agent’s goals are threatened or not
being accomplished). Conversely, optimists self-report more positive experiences than negative
experiences compared to pessimists. In application to the current study, perhaps when an
individual that feels out of control (engages in Present Fatalism), influenced by forces outside of
the self (susceptibility to control), and consistently remembers experiences when goals were not
accomplished or pain was experienced (Rumination). In turn, does not think about the positive
experiences (Past Positive), he or she, when asked about the future, will project based on past
experiences that are most salient (facilitated by Rumination), will consider future circumstances
to be bleak (Pessimism).
Optimism. Optimism shared an additional reciprocally predictive relationship with Hope
Agency, predicts a Past Positive time perspective, and is predicted by Autonomy Interest-Taking.
Firstly, Optimism predicts a Past Positive time orientation, which is to say that a positive
outcome expectancy predicts the likelihood that a person will reflect on positive experiences
from the past. Past positive items imply that people have experienced and remember more
positive events in their past, which may serve to develop an optimistic life orientation and/or a
biased Past Positive perspective.
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Participants who believe that future outcomes would be favorable were less likely to be
depressed and to ruminate but were more likely feel they had enough goal-directed energy (Hope
Agency).
Novel findings exist concerning the bidirectional relationship between Optimism and
Hope Agency, as no known research has examined Optimism and agency. As agency is
described by Synder et al. (1991) as the will to complete a task, a potential moderator for the
relationship between Agency and the degree to which one is optimistic is self-regulatory energy.
Poor self-regulation has been linked to failure to complete goals in numerous studies (see Vohs
& Baumeister, 2011) so perhaps the degree to which one can self-regulate moderates the
relationship between Hope Agency and Optimism. This would imply that sustained Optimism in
the presence of goal threatening stimuli is in part determined by how well a person is able to
maintain the necessary behaviors appraised for accomplishing the intended goal. A person
unable to self-regulate would then likely be less capable of maintaining the proper cognitivebehavioral interaction and would shift to processing information that is either more immediately
essential for survival or easier to process.
Autonomy. Autonomy, while not directly predictive of Depression, did predict Optimism
and Pessimism, specifically the Interest Taking and Susceptibility to Control subscales,
respectively. There has not been much examination of this relationship in the literature on
Optimism and autonomy having a positive affect towards a goal may increase the likelihood of
attaining that goal or possibly give a person more self-regulatory energy to devote to cognitive
resources needed to execute behaviors necessary for the accomplishment of that goal.
It seems the degree to which a person agrees with statements that are promotive of
reflective practices (i.e. “I often reflect on why I react the way I do”; Weinstein, Przybylski, &
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Ryan, 2012) specifically targeted at what actions that person could control (Autonomy Interest
Taking) predicted the degree to which that person was optimistic about his or her future,
although the Weinstein et al. report reflection is more heuristically similar to interest that a
person takes in themselves. Conversely, the degree to which a person agrees with statements that
indicate a lack of control of his or her actions (Susceptibility to Control) predicted the degree to
which that person was pessimistic about his or her actions. Past literature has identified a positive
link between autonomy granting in child-rearing practices and Optimism later in life (Hasan &
Power, 2002) so it is possible that this link can persist cognitively to increasing and decreasing
degrees as development occurs. Future research on this relationship between perceived control of
actions and a person’s future outlook may serve to inform the growing literature of positive
psychology regarding cognitive-behavioral interventions for Depression and other disorders
where achievement of one’s full potential is hindered.
We now examine two constructs that previously linked to Depression, however, this
pattern was not replicated in the current study: Rumination and working memory.
Rumination. Although Rumination is related to depression, other studies show that that
relationship is mediated by other factors, including optimism (Tucker et al., 2013). The present
study showed a similar pattern wherein rumination did not predict depression but that rumination
was related to other constructs. Rumination shared positive reciprocal relationships with Past
Negative, Present Fatalistic, and Pessimism and was negatively predicted by Optimism. The
reciprocal relationships represent perspectives concerning experiences of the past (Past
Negative), present (Present Fatalism), and Future (Pessimism), specifically the negative aspects
of those experiences.
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The relationship between Rumination and Past Negative is not surprising, as it suggests
that a negative life outlook is more important to consider regarding Depression than the constant
negative thoughts that are characteristic of Rumination. This could potentially create a negative
cognitive feedback loop where a person who constantly ruminates examines his or her future
expectations and the most accessible, salient attitude towards future outcomes is negative.
The relationship between Pessimism and Rumination may also help explain the
relationship between Rumination and Present Fatalism. A person may ruminate on Past Negative
thoughts, feel Hopeless concerning present circumstances which could be enough to have the
person feel depressed. A pessimistic outlook may perpetuate this cycle of past and present
negative thinking as reflected by the reciprocally predictive relationship between Pessimism and
Depression. Further research is needed to respond to the implications of this data such that life
orientation (future) be used to determine a collective propensity to Depression and engaging in
ruminative (past) and fatalistic (present) thinking are activities that people should avoid
cognitively participating in.
Working Memory. Previous research has linked deficits in working memory to
Depression (Bartova et al., 2015; Brooks et al., 2015; Dumas & Newhouse, 2015; Hubbard et al.,
2016) but why were working memory and depression not directly linked in the current study? A
few explanations may answer this question. First, the current study sampled a non-clinically
depressed population whereas other studies have examined clinically depressed persons
(Joorman & Gotlib, 2008; Levens & Gotlib, 2010; Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009).
Furthermore, the measurement used in other studies varied from the current one. For example, in
a study by Joorman, Levens, and Gotlib (2011), working memory scores were not lower in the
depressed group compared to the non-depressed group rather, participants took longer to process
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negative information. Lastly, previous researchers have found a link between working memory
and Depression using emotional stimuli (i.e. faces, emotional words) whereas the current study
examines these variables in the context of neutral emotional affect. Perhaps working memory is
recruited during emotionally-charged information processing and Depression is a disorder that
recruits working memory to perpetuate a false, negative narrative of the self and the
environment. Future research should consider the implied or explicit effect of chosen cognitive
variables.
Depression. Depression was predicted by Present Fatalism, Hope Agency, and Optimism
and Pessimism. Depression exhibited a predictive relationship with Optimism and Pessimism, as
previously demonstrated in Alloway and Horton (under review, 2016). General results indicated
that persons were more likely to be depressed if they believed that they do not have control over
the present circumstances (Present Fatalism) or that future outcomes will be favorable
(Pessimism). Additionally, people were less likely to be depressed if they believed that future
outcomes will be favorable (Optimism) and that they had the energy to achieve their goals. These
relationships reflect positive and negative cognitive mechanisms regarding Depression.
Implications are discussed below.
The current study provides evidence that control or, rather, a perception of control in
present circumstances may influence the likelihood of Depression and this is applicable to the
general population. Society and social networks are ever-more complex as civilization progresses
and there are many times daily that individuals feel out of control in relation to accomplishing
their goals. For example, a person may have the goal to run a list of errands but along the time
taken to accomplish those goals, she will have to be subjected to an unknown amount of
controllable circumstances that may impede her progress. Those who may not have the cognitive
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capacity, energy, or social support, all of which are factors that increase the likelihood of goal
completion (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011), may continue to believe that
current circumstances are fixed and uncontrollable and the future will likely not be much
different.
Changes to Beck’s Cognitive Triadic Model of Depression
Beck’s Cognitive Triadic Model of Depression also places an emphasis on future
outcomes being viewed as negative by depressed persons, however, this perspective is limited.
The findings from the current study puts forward additional evidence for the inclusion of
measures of past and present time orientations to accompany the current measures of future time
orientations. Although the current study’s model should be tested in follow-up studies for
reliability to establish validity, these results indicate that if a person believes that current events
are fixed and uncontrollable, then he is more likely to think only about the pleasure of the
moment (Present Hedonism) or about Past Negative experience (Past Negative and Rumination).
Although the Experience component of Beck’s model was not explicitly measured, it is
possible that Present Fatalism is a latent measure of this component. In depressed persons,
dysfunctional explanations and interpretations of adverse experiences result in dysfunctional
attitudes about the self which integrate cognitively as negative schemas about the self. When
later adverse experiences occur that activate these negative schemas, the depressed person shows
a distinct negativity bias in the information attended to, processed, and recalled (Beck, 2008).
Perhaps a Present Fatalistic time orientation is a latent measure of the state-induced or more
persistent activation of this negative schema. Activation of a negative schema and subsequent
attentiveness towards negative stimuli may precede feelings of helplessness in the present
moment and if this schema is constantly activated, perhaps a person would tend to over use a
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Present Fatalistic time perspective, resulting in a predictive relationship with depression. Future
time perspective research should consider this potential explanation when studying depressed
samples.
Future Research and Limitations
The current study demonstrates that present and past time perspectives are important in
understanding the scope of Depression throughout various cognitive processes as they provide
information on how a person is cognitively processing information with respect to other
experiences. The authors also acknowledge that this was a non-clinical population and, thereby,
results from this study may not be applicable to severely depressed persons, whom are clearly
most at risk for suicidal tendencies. However, future research could apply the current study’s
model to a clinically depressed sample to determine the reliability of these results as to further
inform the literature on depression. Additionally, due to non-response attrition, sample sizes
were small which may have limited the exploration of more nuanced patterns between the
variables. Larger sample sizes would have also allowed for more accurate model testing such as
structural equation modeling to test the goodness-of-fit of the regression model proposed in the
current study.
Future research may also explore treatment applications derived from Time Perspective
Therapy (TPT). There is some arguably converging evidence that this therapy may aid in
developing cognitive buffers to or possibly treat depression (Sword, Sword, Brunskill, &
Zimbardo, 2014; Zimbardo, Sword, & Sword, 2012). Time Perspective Therapy is currently
being used in counseling settings to treat military veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) by prescribing patients cognitive-behavioral techniques that utilize the positive,
promotive time perspective orientations. This approach is derived from the perspective that over-
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utilization of any time perspective orientation is harmful and that a balanced overall time
perspective profile is optimal for psychological health. This profile is described as high
engagement in Past Positive, moderate, selective engagement in Present Hedonism, high to
moderate engagement in Future, and low engagement in Past Negative and Present Fatalism.
People who have a balanced time perspective profile (even those who develop the profile via
therapy) are significantly less likely to experience symptoms associated with depression
(Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004) and PTSD (Sword, Sword, Brunskill, & Zimbardo, 2014). Perhaps
TPT could facilitate the lessening of clinically depressive symptoms, similar to TBT’s effect on
PTSD symptoms. The current study indirectly contributes to the literature on TPT by
highlighting the relationships that different time perspectives share with other cognitive
constructs in the context of Depression.
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